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ABSTR4CT
This paper discusses the likely evolution of the trade and environment issue in the World
Trade Organization after the upcoming ministerial meeting in Singapore this December. It makes
a number of points. Progress within the GATT/WTO on this issue looks likely to be slow and
paitily incremental rather than bold as environmental groups would wish to see. The paper also
argues that despite (and beyond) Singapore, one has to go further than the GATT/WTO to see the
potential evolution of the trade and environment issue. Developments seem likely to be driven in
the next few years as much by factors outside the GATT/WTO as well as within it, as new global
environmental arrangements, some with potentially large trade implications (such as carbon emission
limitation agreements), emerge.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much, if not most, of the substantial recent literature on trade and environment
(see Anderson and Blackhurst (1992), Beghin et al. (1994), Dean (1992), Esty (1994),
Runge (1994), Ulph (1994) and Whalley (1991)) has largely concerned itself with the
issue of whether policy linkage between trade and the environment can, in some sense,
be justified. Is there a rationale for special trade rules to reflect environmental
concerns? When does more trade help or hurt the environment? Should countries be
allowed to use protection to achieve environmental goals? Should trade provisions in
global environmental treaties be agreed to, even if they override provisions of trade
treaties?
In contrast, this paper accepts that trade-environment linkage has entered the
trading system, if for no other reason than that a natural instrument linkage exists, since
(actual or threatened) trade measures can support transnational environmental
objectives of importing countries and (although little discussed ) environmental actions
can, in principle, also support trade objectives of exporting countries (see Copeland and
Taylor (1995)). Such linkage was implicitly accepted at the 1994 Marrakesh meeting
that concluded the Uruguay Round, when a GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and
Environment (CTE) was established. This Committee is to present its initial report at
the first WTO ministerial meeting to be held in Singapore, December 9-13th 1996, and
how this linkage will be reflected in the wider post Singapore trading system now seems
a more pertinent issue rather than whether ajustification for linkage exists.
The paper makes a number of points. Both because of the technical problems and
wider precedents involved with any modifications to the GATT/WTO for
environmental considerations, and the North-South divisions generated by the issue,2
progress within the GATT/WTO on this issue looks likely to be slow and painfilly
incremental rather than bold as environmental groups would wish to see. The mandate
of the Committee on Trade and Environment for its Singapore report is largely limited
to exploring what are the important environmental trade linkages. Little by way of new
substantive proposals can be expected from it in Singapore.
Indeed, even taken largely as a GATTAVTO issue, there seem to be no widely
agreed upon feasible options as ways to proceed; all proposals for ways forward to
GATT/WTO trade and environment reform offered thus far seem to encounter
problems. Advocacy that a fiture WTO Trade Round should be lead by the trade and
environment issue (as a ‘Green Round’) seems not to reflect a realistic assessment both
of where things stand in GATTAVTO on the issue, and the elements of reciprocity
needed to drive a new Round forward.
The paper also argues that despite
firther than the
environment issue.
driven in the next
GATT/WTO to see
(and beyond) Singapore, one also has to go
the potential evolution of the trade and
Developments on the trade and environment issue seem likely to be
few years as much by factors outside the GATT/WTO as well as
within it, as new global environmental arrangements, some with potentially large trade
implications (such as carbon emission limitation agreements), emerge. This has already
arisen in the CTE with discussion of how to treat trade provisions of existing and new
multilateral environmental agreements (MEA)s, such as the Montreal protocol, under
the GATT/WTO. A credible argument is that the focus thus far on trade and
. environment issues of symbolic but limited quantitative significance in the trade and
environment debate seems poised to change as discussion (outside of GATT/WTO) of3
a possible global environmental measures with potentially large trade effects
accelerates.
The paper concludes by reemphasizing the potential the trade and environment
issue has revealed for reigniting the recently dormant North-South divide on trade.
Developing countries see trade and environment as a discussion of how trade barriers
might go up against them and slow their growth and development, all in the name of
meeting environmental objectives espoused by vocal NGOS in the developed world.
Some of them use language such as ‘green’ or ‘eco’ imperialism, and argue that they
should instead be compensated for showing environmental restraint. In contrast,
environmental groups in the developed world argue that environmental issues are so
serious that these should be the dominant considerations in the setting of the global
policy framework, rather than trade concerns. This is a conflict that seems likely to
intensifi.
In summary, trade and environment remains an issue in flux, and one which is
unlikely to be resolved quickly either in Singapore or through subsequent GATT/WTO
negotiation. Also to treat trade and environment as solely a GATT/WTO issue risks
missing the wider potential significance of environmental policy issues for the trading
system; and its ability to resurrect North-South divisions in the trading system. This is
especially the case given the complicating precedents the issue raises for other types of
fiture negotiable trade linkages (such as labour standards).4
II. THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT ISSUE, THE lVTO, AND
THE URUGUAY ROUND
General Consideratio]ls
The trade and environment issue is one that has come to have high profile in both
the trade and the environment communities in recent years, In reality, there is no single
issue, but instead a series of inter-related subissues which have agglomerated to fiel an
ongoing debate as to what should be done about trade and environment linkage both
within the framework of the WTO and more broadly.
At one level, consensus over possible trade and environment linkage derives from
the argument, made early on in the debate, that increased trade inevitably implies
increased consumption and production, and hence, lowered environmental quality. This
theme was reflected in Congressional debates in 1991 and 1992 on NAFTA as it went
throush its various stages, where extreme environmental problems in the Maquiladora
zone, including large untreated discharges into rivers, high infection rates in US border
communities attributed to shared US-Mexican aquifers, and other related problems,
were seen as inevitably worsening under a NAFTA with yet more US-Mexican trade. 1
This view that environmental worsening necessarily follows from increased trade
is, however, now widely seen as overly simplistic. In the last few decades, developing
countries who have been more outward-oriented in their trade policies (such as Korea
1Leonard and Christensen (1991) strongly made Lhesearguments
2Ho\vever, Copeland and Taylor (1994) sho~vhotv a simple static model of North-South trade can be
‘ used to examine lifiages bet~k’een national income, pollution, and international trade and produce
results along these Iines. TIVO countries produce a continuum of goods, each differing in pollution
intensity. -They sholv that the higher income country chooses stronger environmental protection and
specializes in relatively clean goods. By isolating the scale, composition, and technique effects of
international trade on pollution, they also sho~vthat free trade increases }vorldpollution. An increase
in the Rich North’s production possibilities increases pollution, \vhile a similar gro~~~hin the poor
South lo}verspollution; and unilateral transfers from North to South reduce ~vorld}videpollution.5
compared to, say, India up to the late 19S0s) seem to have achieved higher rather than
lower environmental standards, In part, this is due to their need to sell into higher
income markets with higher environmental standards, which has required them to
produce higher environmental standard products, In achieving high grow-th rates for
significant periods of time, and hence higher living standards, these same countries also
seem to have witnessed a clear positive impact on environmental quality, reflecting, in
part, the income elasticity of their own demand for environmental quality. OECD
countries’ standards for air and water quality are also considerably higher today than
they were 50 years ago (again due to higher incomes, and a positive income elasticity of
demand for environmental quality), even though these same economies now trade
considerably more as a percentage of GDP than formerly. The GATT (1992a) Annual
Report built on these observations to argue, that, firstly, because gains are achievable
through trade, real incomes will rise with increased trade; and, secondly, that if these
income gains are spent on environmental
environmental quality will result
protection, higher rather than lower
At quite another level, debate on trade and environment linkage centres on the
claim that environmental problems are now so serious that new and much needed
environmental policy cannot be allowed to be thwarted by concerns over trade policy3.
The argument is that the use of trade-restricting measures on environmental grounds
should be allowed, even if presently not sanctioned by GATT/WTO. Thus, special
trade promotion devices related to environmental objectives (such as export subsidies
for pollution control equipment) should be allowed; trade restrictions which offset the
effect of low environmental standards are justifiable; and provisions contained in
3See Sh~bman (1989, 1990).6
existing trade treaties (such as GATT/WTO, or the Treaty of Rome) should not
preclude the use of new environmental arrangements, simply on grounds of precedent.
The line of argument is that what is needed is to develop appropriate global
management strategies for scarce environmental resources, and that trade policy is a
key supporting mechanism to implement such resource management, rather than a
policy to be decided upon solely on trade considerations.
The counter arguments to this reflect the contention that the benefits of an open
trading system in the form of gains from trade have been slowly built up over 50 years
of multilateral negotiation, and should not be easily surrendered to new protectionism
sanctioned by environmental concernsq. Any special treatment for the environment
under existing trade rules is also seen as setting a dangerous precedent. A domino
theory of the trading system is sometimes raised; i.e., that special treatment for one
issue will lead to special treatment for other issues, with, eventually, a disappearance in
generality of the rule regime in the trading system as we know it today, Reinforcing
these concerns is the risk of environmental capture; i.e. that trade policy could become
more protectionist, not due to genuine environmental considerations motivating trade
policy, but rather from protectionist interests using environmental arguments for their
own ends and legitimizing their narrow sectional interests by appeal to environmental
rationales~.
.
4See, for instance, Bha~vati (1993).
5See the anal}lical discussions of this ne~vpolitical economy dimension to trade policy in Hillman and
Ursprung (1994).The }VTO
Within the GATT/WTO, the trade and environment issue has also steadily grown
in profile in recent years with the development of the wider trade and environment
debate outlined aboveb, In its first forty years relatively few environmental cases came
before GATT dispute settlement, and the only (somewhat oblique) environmental
content of GATT contained in Article XX remained little clarified by dispute case
resolution’,
A central event in changing this situation was the report of the 1991 GATT panel
requested by Mexico following US trade actions based on the practices of tuna
fishermen off the Mexican west coast, and which subsequently ruled in Mexico’s
favour. The issue was that tuna were being caught in nets which incidentally entangled
dolphins, causing some of the dolphins to be killed, The United States had made
repeated representations to Mexico to reduce the number of dolphins killed in these
tuna catches, Appealing to US legislation under the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
Earth Island Institute, a California nonprofit group, moved in 1990 to ban the
importation of canned, frozen and fresh tuna into the US from 5 countries (Mexico,
Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador and Vanuatu), The US also implemented a labelling
requirement under this law that set out the conditions under which canned tuna sold in
the United States could be described as caught in a dolphin-friendly manner.
6See Chamovitz (1992).
7Appendix C of Es~ (1994) outlines both previous GA~ cases, and rele~:antUS and EU case Ia\v.
Some of the earlier GAn cases \vhich touched on environmental issues invol~ed excise duties on
imported petroleum and products in the US to fund environmental clean up (the 1971 Superfund case);
Canadian restrictions on esport of unprocessed fish products from the West Coast fishery (1988), and
import bans on cigarettes in Thailand (1990),8
The request for a panel by Mexico and the subsequent panel decision in Mexico’s
favour attracted widespread attention because it was the first time that a GATT panel
was asked to rule on an environmental issue in this way. There were public
representations made in Geneva from environmental groups protesting the case and
emphasizing what they saw as the anti-environment nature of the GATT. In their view
concern for dolphins, not profit, should have been the driving force behind trade policy
in the case,
Mexico based its case on two separate arguments. The first was that the US had
no rights under GATT to impose such a trade ban. The United States argued that
under Article XX(b) of the GATT it had rights to use trade bans to protect endangered
species. The Mexican argument was that were no endangered species at issue; in this
case the only point of contention was the nature of the fishing methods used. The
Mexicans also appealed the US Iabelling condition as to when canned tuna could be
displayed with a logo indicating that dolphin-friendly methods were used to catch the
tuna, on the grounds that this would involve a violation of the mark-of-origin
provisions of the GATT under Article IV, which only requires an indication of country
of origin,
Following the tuna-dolphin panel report in favour of Mexicos, dissatisfaction grew
on GATT’s position on trade and environment issues on several fronts. Environment
groups saw GATT as anti-environment since it did not uphold the use of a trade
*The panel tinding on behalf of Mexico mled that the US ban ~1-as a violation of GATT Article III, and
‘ that the Article XX exceptions in GA~ could not be applied on an extraterritorial basis ruling them
inapplicable in this case. Ho\vever, the panel report ruled in favour of the US on the labelling issue.
The panel-report \vas not pushed fonvard to adoption by the GATT Council for a variety of reasons,
including Mexico’s then emerging NAFI’A negotiation; so the EC subsequently brought a second
complaint on tuna-dolphin dealing }vithimport bans in the US Marine Mammal Protection Act from
third countries \vho trade \vith countries against \vhom primary actions are taken. The panel report
(Tuna-Dolphin II) in 1994 ruled against the US, but on some~vhatdifferent grounds. See Es& (1994)
pp.268-269.9
restricting measure to limit incidental dolphin kills. The US Congress saw GATT as
overriding the content of domestic US legislation to protect mammals; and more
broadly the environmental content of GATT was seen as vague, weak, and in need of
clarification and repair. The extremely limited environmental content of the Uruguay
Round decisions (reflecting the 1986 negotiating mandate) intensified these concerns,
as did the absence of any reference to the environment in the founding charter of the
WTO,
The Uruguay Round
Despite the profile of the trade and environment issue in the mid to late stages of
the Uruguay Round9, the decisions from the Round do not deal directly with trade and
environment issues since they were not formally part of the negotiating mandate. Much
was made by environmental groups of the observation that the word ‘environment’ did
not appear in the Drafi Final Act from the Round (the Dunkel Text), which, including
tariff schedules, ran to some 26,000 pages of textlO. Also, the failure of the decisions
establishing the WTO to set out fiture environmental objectives was seen as a chance
squandered, and maybe lost for decades, to centrally address the trade and environment
issue and establish broad principles in this area to guide the WTO
Nonetheless, trade and environment issues were important in
parallel to the negotiations themselves, and in particular played
in its fiture work.
developments running
a role in defining the
‘ 9A number of events contributed to raising the profiIeof trade and environment (virtually unheard of
at its launch in Punts del Este in 1986) during [he later part of the Uruguay Round besides the
tuna/dolphin dispute. These included the Earth Summit at Rio in June 1992; the vocal opposition of
environmentalists to the NAFTA, and the effofis of environmental groups to block adoption of both the
N~A and the Uruguay Round decisions in the US.
‘0For a summary of the Uruguay Round agreements, see }Vhalleyand Hamillon (1996).10
work program for the WTO following the Round, Also, as Uimonen (1995) argues, it
is not the case that the Uruguay Round decisions are free of environmental implications
The Round includes agreements which discipline the trade restricting effects of
standards and regulations which have environmental implications, and the agreements
on subsidies, countervailing
for environmental issues.
duties and intellectual property rights all have implications
At a more technical level, the sanita~ and phytosanitary measures and technical
barriers to trade (TBT) agreements address problems raised by a number of contentious
environmental and trade casesl 1, Their objective was to minimize the extent to which
standards and regulations can have negative effects on trade, or act as disguised trade
barriers, while still permitting GATT contracting parties to adopt or maintain standards
that are necessary for the protection of human, plant, and animal life and health.
In the technical barriers to trade agreement, measures include those for
environmental protection, as
process methods (PPMs.)
well as those regulations which apply to production and
Each of these agreements defines a national treatment
obligation as well as a necessity test, with the aim of minimizing adverse effects of
measures taken, much like in GATT Article XX, with loose harmonization agreements
for each of the two.
As Uimonen notes, the TBT agreement could prove a catalyst for future
environmental trade because the Uruguay Round disciplines in this area seemingly
restrict domestic policies rather than border measures. European countries, for
instance, have been playing a leading role in developing new regulations covering waste
11Including the Canadian beer can case \\’hich involved a ne~venvironmental le}~ on beer packaged in
cans. For details, see GATT (1992b) Focus 91, p.211
production and recycling, which include waste take-back schemes requiring producers
to either take back their packaging waste for disposal or recycling, or pay fees to local
authorities to accomplish the same objective, and these could be affected.
The Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement makes several changes to earlier trade
rules, and with potentially significant implications for environmental issues. The
approach is one of recognizing the rights of contracting parties to protect themselves
through the use of PPMs and related subsidies, while avoiding misuse of countervailing
measures of protection, The Agreement offers a definition of subsidy, previously not
contained in the GATT, in the form ‘specific’ ‘z subsidies, and classifies them according
to three categories. The Agreement also lists general subsidies characterized by
government financial contributions as nonspecific and nonactionable subsidies; thus
nonspecific environmental subsidies are now permitted.
On other environmentally related matters, the Uruguay Round generated results
with varying degrees of ambiguity. In the area of standards, the thrust of the
agreements from the Round is to discipline trade barriers, while allowing for differences
in non-border measures. Exactly how much discipline will be exerted on national
regulations, especially in the case of sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and what will
constitute sufficient scientific justification for high standards remains unclear. Under
the subsidies agreement, however, the use of countervailing measures to deal with
unfair trade practices in the form of lax environmental standards is not permitted. But
the agreement does imply that subsidies that take the form of foregone revenue for
environmental taxes can be countervailable if they are specific.
‘2A ‘specific’ subsidy is one considered only available to ‘an enterprise or indust~ or group of
enterprises or industries \vithin thejurisdiction of the authority granting the subsidy’, GA~ (1994).
The definition of a subsidy also rests on \vhether there is a financial contribution by a government or
any public body.12
Post Uruguay Round13
At the ministerial meeting which concluded the Uruguay Round at Marrakesh in
April 1994, the contracting parties agreed both that trade and environment should be on
the fiture agenda for the WTO, and that a new Committee on Trade and the
Environment (CTE) should be formed to assess trade and environment linkages. This
Committee is to give its first report in Singapore in December 1996.
It was agreed that the agenda for the CTE work on trade and environment would
cover (i) the
GATT/WTO,
relationship between multilateral environmental arrangements and the
(ii) how environmental policies with significant trade effects impact the
trading system (iii) how environmental taxes and charges interact with trade rules (iv)
eco-labelling issues (v) WTO dispute settlement and MEAs (vi) environmental policy
measures and market access and (vii) domestically prohibited goods, Progress on most
of these issues has been slow. In essence, developed countries, and especially the EU,
have argued for modifications to GATT/WTO disciplines for environmental reasons;
while developing countries, feafil of legitimizing protection against their exports have
taken a more cautious stance. Little of substance in any of these areas is expected to be
concluded at Singapore.
On production and processing methods, proposals have been made to modifi the
present GATT principle of national treatment contained in Article III, and more
specifically, the concept of like products, which presently disallows any distinction in
trade policy treatment between products made in a clean’ and ‘dirty’ manner. Present
13A1s0see the description of Lhe\vider post Uru~lay Round agenda covering environmental and non-
environmental issues in Woolcock (1996).GATTfiVTO rules are seen as inconsistent with activist domestic environmental
policies, since they inevitably imply a competitive disadvantage to domestic industries,
if exporting countries have lower standards, On MEAs, the aim has been to secure a
GATT/WTO accommodation of the trade provisions of their agreements before any
GATT/WTO inconsistent measures are taken under the Montreal protocol. Proposals
include expanding the scope of GATT Article XX exceptions to explicitly cover MEA
trade measures; the granting of GATTAVTO Waivers for such trade measures; and the
grant of limited (contained) waivers which would condition the use of MEA trade
measures. On other less significant issues, accommodation may be possible; joint
Codes of Conduct for eco-labelling schemes is one. But in general, the picture is one of
limited movement on the trade and environment issues in the CTE agenda pre
Singapore,
At a less technical level, however, trade and environment continues to be
repeatedly cited as a major component of the likely fiture focus for global trade policy
negotiation and debate. Renato Ruggiero, Director General oft he WTO, has identified
trade and environment as one of four issues (along with competitive policy, Iabour
standards, and investment) which will shape the fiture work programme of the WTO,
and eventually form the lead issues of a fiture multilateral negotiating Round.
Immediately afier the Uruguay Round, there were several calls for a new negotiating
Round to be a ‘Green Round’, and such calls, while less frequent, are still heard.
This profile for trade and environment as a lead issue within GATTAVTO thus
. seemingly coexists with difficulties in making much progress in Singapore, and clear
divisions between developed and developing countries on the issue. The trade and
environment component of any fiture negotiation would also be a rule writing rather14
than traditional reciprocity based negotiation, and one with precedents for other
potential rule writing exercises (such as Iabour standards). LVhilethe Uruguay Round
established precedents for rule writing concessions (for instance, in Intellectual Property
by the developing countries) it further complicates any leading role to be played by the
issue in a fiture multilateral negotiating Round.15
III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA FOR GATT~VTO AFTER
SINGAPORE’”
Given both the limited concrete pro,gress on the trade and environment
seems likely in Singapore and its likely continued high profile as a potential
issue that
lead issue
for a fiture negotiating Round, it seems usefil to speculate how the debate on the issue
may develop within the WTO after Singapore, out into the medium term. I would
argue both that the technical problems and worries over precedent
accommodation within the WTO on the trade and environment
will complicate any
issue and cleavage
between developed and developing countries on trade and environment will be likely
remain and even intensifi afier Singapore. Also, increasingly it will be the case that
developments outside the GATT/WTO, such as the potential trade effects of new
global environmental
concluded in regional
Thus, the talk of
agreements, and, to a lesser extent, environmental arrangements
agreements, will enter and drive the debate.
either a separate environmental negotiation - a ‘Green Round’ of
negotiations, or an environment-lead new wider Round - talk that was heard even
before the
have been
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, may well continue, The pressures which
building for changes to be made within the GATT/WTO to accommodate
environmental concerns may also remain as the focus for GATT/WTO debate on trade
and environment afier Singapore, but with growing frustration both from advocates and
opponents of change. Concerns of environmental groups over what they see as
secretive GATT/WTO processes, in which they have no rights to appear or appeal will
persist. Linkage not only of GATT/WTO arrangements to multilateral environmental
—
‘4This section dra~vsheavily on the discussion in Uimonen and Whalley (1996), Ch.6)16
agreements but also to new MEAs and onto trade patterns will become an evermore a
key issue.
None of this indicates that nothing can be done in GATT~TO post Singapore on
trade and environment, as those who saw the seemingly deep divide on services pre
Uruguay Round (in early 1986) will recall. But exactly how trade and environment
would eventually be accommodated in GATT/WTO at this stage is unclear, both
technically and politically; and what the GATT/WTO response would be, if there were
one, to the wider impacts of environmental policies is at this stage unknown.
Broad GATT/WTO Modification
A variety of proposals have been offered as to how environmental considerations
could be taken into account in fiture GATT/WTO agreements. One might be to more
filly utilize what is presently available in the GATT, including the Article XXV waiver
mechanism to allow for the use of otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures on
evnironmental grounds. Another would be to seek changes to the GATT/WTO rules so
as to allow for wide-ranging exceptions on environmental grounds. There could also be
more narrowly focused elaborations and clarifications to the GATT agreements now in
the WTO, aiming to deal centrally with environment and trade issues,
Waivers for individual Contracting Parties under Article XXV could be used for
environmentally related trade restricting measures that would otherwise violate present
GATT/WTO arrangements. Approval of a waiver requires a three-quarters majority.,
Environmental waivers could possibly take on more general forms than those which
have been seen in the GATT thus far, which are usually narrowly focused and granted
to only one Contracting Party at a time. There could be bloc waivers, given17
simultaneously to subgroups (or even all) Contracting Parties, and allowing them to use
specific trade-restricting measures for environmental purposes. There could even be
broad-ranging waivers setting out general conditions under which environmental
exceptions would be allowed.
Waivers have the attraction of addressing environmental concerns while leaving the
existing structure of GATT/WTO disciplines unchanged, thus avoiding any need for a
potentially complex and divisive rule rewriting negotiation. However, a series of
waivers granted on a case-by-case basis runs the risk of yielding a chaotic and
inconsistent outcome, Each waiver request would have to go through a separate
waiver approval process, repeatedly raising potential problems in reaching agreement.
Also, more widespread use of waivers in the environmental area seems to go against the
current GATT/WTO trend of downplaying the use of waivers in other areas (such as
agriculture).
Another way to bring environmental considerations more filly into the
GATT/WTO would be to directly amend the General Agreement to allow for more
explicit environmental exceptions than it now contains, although the requirements are
stringent, Some key GATT articles (including Articles I and III) require acceptance by
all members, while others require a two-thirds majority. Furthermore, amendments
must pass national treaty ratification procedures, which further reduces the potential for
success,
Table 1 reproduces a list of the main GATT articles that could potentially be
involved in such a negotiation given in Uimonen and Whalley (1996) 15. The scope of
the possible changes to the GATT~TO is immediately striking. Central to any such
‘5See alsoArden-Clarke (199 1), and Patterson (1991).18
negotiation would be an attempt to clarify or change the language of XX(b) and XX(g).
But other articles, including ~N and national treatment (Articles I and III) - the
cornerstones of the GATT - might also be subjected to environmental review, as might
a number of other key articles (VI, XI, XIII, XIV, XVI, XIX, XX) and trade provisions
explicitly applying to developing countries (XVIII, and Part IV). Such a wide ranging
negotiation on rule rewriting covering many GATT Articles would almost
certainlyprove dificult to conclude, especially as many non environmental issues would
likely be raised by individual countries, Alternatively, narrowing such a negotiation to
only a few Articles makes it dificult to launch, because individual countries would want
to see issues of particular importance to them dealt with.
An alternative but related approach might be to negotiate a side agreement on
trade and the environment to so as to supplement and clari& the meaning of existing
Articles of the General Agreement and other agreements in the WTO as they relate to
environmental issues. For example, rules ranging from subsidy and competitiveness
issues to procedures for the application of unilateral measures for environmental
protection could be subject to clarification and elaboration. In addition, following
GATT tradition since the Kennedy Round, ‘special and differential treatment’ on
environmental issues could be granted to less-developed countries, perhaps in the form
of longer time periods to implement environmentally related decisions.19
II Potential Environmentally Motivated Changes in Selected GATT~VTO Articles”
Article Rule Environmental Issues
1, Most-Favoured-Nation The most favorable Distinguishing products on
treatment for exports and the basis of environmental
imports must be granted to impact of products and/or
‘like’ products of all PPMs,
count ries.
II. Schedule of Negotiated tariff bindings. A1lo\v for border adjustments
Concessions ArI exception to tariff on products using
bindings allo}vs for border tax environmentally damaging
adjustments on imports PPMs.
equivalent to domestic Disallo\v adjustments tvhen
charges on like products imports have no cross-border
consistent kvith Article 111. environmental effects.
III. National Treatment Once they have cleared Distinguishing products on
customs and border basis of environmental impact
procedures, imported goods of products andor PPMs.
are to be treated no less
favorably than like domestic
products ~vith respect to
domestic taxes and
regulations.
VI. Anti-dumping and Alloiv ADDs on imports Margins of dumping and
Countewailing Duties equal to the dumping margin subsidy to include marginal
Yvhenthere is material injury social costs of environmental
as a result of dumping. danlage.
Allo\v CVDS on subsidized Countervailability of
imports \vhen there is pollution abatement subsidies,
material injuw, ‘Izx standard’subsidies.
IX. Marks of Origin Provides for MFN \vith Treatment of ‘ecolabelling’
regard to Iabelling lal~s.
requirements; countries
should minimize adverse
trade effects of marks of
origin regulations.
X, Public and Administration Countries should maximize Extension of transparency
of Trade Regulations transparency of regulations requirements to
affect ing trade. environmental measures and
their scientific justification.
XI. Quantitative Restrictions Prohibits quantitative Elaborate on or clarifi
restraints on imports and environmentally based
exports subject to certain exceptions.
exceptions,
XII and XN. Non- Allo\vable QRs to be applied Allo\vable QRs to be applied
discrimination in QRs and similarly to all countries and similarly to all countries and
:xceptions exceptions to this rule exceptions to this rule
*This is reproduced here with slight modification from Table 6,01 in Uirnonen and Whalley
(1996)20
XVI. Export Subsidies Export subsidies for primary Further disciplines on
products should not result in environnlentally damaging
a more than equitable share of domestic subsidies.
\vorld trade. Allo\vances for CVDS against
Conditional prohibition of countries ~vith ‘lax’standards
export subsidies to non- on some margin reflecting
primary products. social cost.
Tokyo Round Code
prohibited these subsidies,
increased discipline on
domestic subsidies.
Umguay Round prohibits
non-agricultural export
subsidies, firther increases
disciplines on domestic
subsidies
~. Border Adjustment Rebate of indirect taxes on Disallo\v rebates for
products or inputs contained enviromlental taxes, energy
in products upon export is taxes on exported goods.
permitted.
Uruguay Round allo~vs for
rebate of indirect taxes on
enrgy used in production.
XVIII. Developing Country AIIOJVS developing countries Allo\\ances for
rariff Protection to give tariff and other enviromlentally based
assistance for purpose of measures for developing
economic development and to countries.
improve standards of living.
XIX. Safeguards Allo\vs countries to take Allo\vances for trade
othenvise GATT-inconsistent measures to deal \vith sudden
measures temporarily \vhen enviromlental problems
imports harm a competing associated \vith imports or
domestic industry. exports.
XX, General Exceptions Allo}vs measures ‘necessary’ Loosening of ‘necessity’ test.
for protection of health and Allo\vances for second-best
safety ‘relating to’ protection measures. AlIo}vances for
of etiaustible natural extra-jurisdictional
resources. application of measures.
Allo\vances for sanctions.
XXIV. Free Trade Areas and Criteria for regional trading Require EIAs in evaluating
~ustoms Unions arrangements to be GATT- RTAs and consistency of
consistent. environmentally related
provisions of such
agreements.
*~is is reproduced here ~vith slight modification from Table 6.01 in Uimonen and Whalley
(1996)21
Part IV. Special and Exceptions or easements for
Differential Treatment developing countries from
any ne}v environmental
disciplines, Exceptions for
developing countries to allo~v
for othenvise GATT-
inconsistent measures related
to environmental protection.
l This is reproduced here ~vith slight modification from Table 6,01 in Uimonen and Whalley
(1996)22
However, in the short run, it seems likely that the only practical mechanism
available for fundamental environmental rule modification in the GATT/WTO
fundamentally will be waivers, and these seem likely to yield an unsatisfactory
conclusion. Even over a longer period, it remains unlikely that the GATT/WTO would
be fundamentally amended, given both the scope of change and the practical difficulties
involved. It at some fiture date, the Contracting Parties attempt to agree on new
trade/environment
supplementing and
rules, it would most likely
interpreting existing rules.
be in the form of a side agreement
Article XX Reform
At the forefront of any effort to change GATT rules as they apply to the
environment would be both clarification and reconsideration of Article =
exceptionslG. The issue here is as much one of determining what the current rules
actually imply, as it is one of changing existing rules.
There is currently substantial confision about the precise meaning of Article XX
exceptions, Previous Article XX panels appear to have reached a consensus, that
measures must be ‘necessary’ for health and safety or ‘primarily aimed at’ the
conservation of an exhaustible resource. But confision remains over whether
exceptions should be narrowly defined to prevent their abuse, and the justification for
such a narrow definition. For instance, the first17 tuna-dolphin panel restricted the
scope of Article
. backtracked from
XX by limiting its jurisdictional
the first panel on this point, and it
application. The second panel
substituted a criterion whereby a
“ See the extensive discussion of Article XX issues in Charnovitz (1992), and EST (1994, Ch.9)
‘7See the earlier discussion in footnote 8, p.8, on the l~votuna-dolphin panels.country could not impose trade restrictions for environmental or other reasons, if the
only way it could achieve its objective was by forcing the affected country to change its
domestic policies.
There have been proposals for wide-ranging amendments to Article XX, to the
effect that nothing in the GATT/WTO would prevent any Contracting Party from
taking any action ‘which it may deem necessary to protect the environment, including
the establishment of import or export restrictions, and the use of subsidies ...’
(Shrybman, 1989). These have been linked to provisions that, in any GATT/WTO
dispute regarding actions taken to protect the environment (domestic or otherwise) the
onus should be on the complainant to prove that the measure ‘was not taken in good
faith and that it was unreasonable’ (Shrybman, 1989)1s. A precedent for such proposa!s
appears to be GATT Article XX(h) which provides exemptions for signatories to
international commodity agreements along related lines. The obvious weakness is that
such exemptions would provide open-ended cover for protection, as well as promote
inefficient environmental policy. Under the cover of such an exemption any trade
actions could, in principle, be taken in the name of environmental concerns 19, Because
of this, opposition to such proposals is especially strong, particularly from developing
countries.
Trade restrictions on products with PPMs that cause environmental damage in the
importing country are also an Article XX issue (as well as an Article III (MFN) issue)
since they were called into question in the second tuna-dolphin panel report, The panel
report asserted that the trade restrictions at issue could not, by themselves, achieve their
]8Similar proposals for broad-ranging exceptions from GA~ obligations for environmental purposes
may be found in Arden-Clarke (1991),
19This obviously raises the political economy issues discussed in Hillmand and Ursprung (1994),24
environmental objective; and so, if allowance is to be made for such second-best
policies, the circumstances under which they would be permitted need to be addressed.
This raises once again the issues implicit in the tuna-dolphin panel reports concerning
‘necessity’ tests; whether extrajurisdictional measures should be disciplined more
severely, and how measures taken in the context of international environmental
agreements should be dealt with.
One possible change might be to permit trade measures for extrajurisdictional
environmental protection, but require that they be ‘necessary’ in a stricter sense than for
measures to protect domestic health, safety, or environment. Such additional criteria
might include demonstration of prior attempts to negotiate an international agreement
under the auspices of an agreed upon international body, such as UNEP; and a ‘good
faith’ estimate and offer of resource transfers, or even trade compensation.
Future reconsideration of the use of trade measures under Article XX may also
draw on the results of UNCED, which reiterated the need to avoid arbitrary
discrimination and disguised trading barriers, as with existing GATT rules. The Rio
Declaration called on countries to avoid unilateral attempts to address environmental
problems which originate outside a country’s territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, it
called on countries to base their solutions on international consensus as far as possible.
If there is a general approach to rewriting Article XX so as to clari~ general
exceptions from GATT/WTO disciplines for environmental trade measures emerging
from these documents, it is to avoid unilateralism and new forms of protectionism as far
as possible. However, there is widespread disagreement as to exactly how to
circumscribe future allowances for environmentally motivated trade measures in
elaborating on these general principles.25
Environmental Regulation
An equally central GATT/WTO issue beyond Singapore will be the interaction of
environmental regulation and trade policy. The national treatment obligation under
GATT/WTO in Article III requires Contracting Parties not use internal taxes or
regulations in ways which give domestic protection, and requires domestic policies to
treat imports no less favorably than ‘like’ domestic products. The GATT has
interpreted this provision as requiring Contracting Parties not to use measures to
discriminate in favour of products. The concept of ‘like’ product has been widely
interpreted as prohibiting trade restrictions based on the processes and methods (PPMs)
used to produce imported goods. PPM-based trade restrictions become prima facie
violations of national treatment, which then must be justified under Article XX if they
are to be allowed.
There are a variety of ways in which these disciplines might be relaxed. One
approach might be to allow any measures which do not violate MFN and national
treatment obligations. This would clearly be inadequate to discipline the protectionist
use of such measures. Another might be to change the wording in Article XX(b) from
‘necessary’ to ‘relating to’ as in Micle XX(g), with the aim of weakening the
requirement that has evolved in past panel disputes, that a measure must be the least
GATT-inconsistent measure reasonably available20. New language might require
measures to be ‘consistent with, and a part o~ the framework of environmental policies
of the nation imposing the measure’ (Patterson, 1992, 107). Thus, rather than
considering trade-restrictive measures within the set of all possible policies to achieve a
given objective with a view toward identi~ing a less GATT-inconsistent measure, this
20See Patterson (1992),26
approach might allow trade-distorting measures related to a nation’s domestic
environmental policies, as long as they avoid (in some sense) in protectionist abuse.
Dispute settlement panels have already examined whether regulatory or tax
distinctions used for non-trade objectives are allowable in determining whether ‘like’
products are treated in accordance with Article III. The task for the WTO dispute
settlement process on these matters has been to walk a line restricting national policy-
making that inevitably entails incidental trade effects, and permitting the use of
ostensibly domestic taxes and regulations for protectionist purposes.
Even if domestic taxes or regulations violate the national treatment obligation
under Article III, they may still be justified under Article ~. This will raise firther
questions post Singapore as to how stringent such exceptions might be. The GATT
approach to trade measures taken to protect domestic health, safety and environment
under Article XX(b) thus far has been to permit them as long as they can be shown to
be ‘necessary’ for the purpose, i.e. that they are the least GATT-inconsistent, or trade-
distorting, measures available. For example, the Umguay Round discisions discipline
standards that are more stringent than international norms, to ensure that they are the
‘least trade-distortionary’ measures available. Whether this approach prevails will be an
issue.
Transparency
Concerns have been frequently expressed in the environmental community over the
seemingly closed procedures used in GATT/WTO negotiations and dispute settlement
of environmental cases, These issues seem likely to persist post Singapore21, The most
21See alsoArden-Clarke (1991) and Jackson (1992).27
significant concerns have focused on the seeming secrecy of the dispute settlement
process since most domestic legal systems define rights to appear before administrative
tribunals, and also give rights to interested parties to appeal decisions, The absence of
such rights in GATT disputes involving environmental issues has concerned many
environmentalists.
The response from the trade community is usually to argue first, that panel
procedures represent efforts to depoliticise political conflicts involving national
governments, and that a more open process would undermine these efforts. They
argue, second, that if such rights are granted to environmental groups, similar rights
would have to be granted to other political groups in both environmental and other
cases, potentially derailing the process.
Another transparency issue involves the provision of information to judge the
environmental effects of proposed policy changes, including the outcome of any fiture
multilateral negotiation.. In the US, federal policies ofien require environmental impact
statements (EISS), under the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act. An unsuccessful
attempt was made in the US courts to force compliance with this act arguing that the
NAFTA and Uruguay Round agreements should be subject to its requirements. While
there may be justification for assessments where narrowly focused trade policy changes
with a significant environmental link are at issue, a requirement for entire trade
agreements where most elements have no direct environmental relationship immediately
apparent, runs the risk of significantly complicating the negotiation and ratification
processes.
While an open process for trade negotiations, such as the Uruguay Round, may
make exchanges of concessions more difficult, a more transparent set of procedures for28
dispute settlement would seem to be an improvement, especially for disputes arising
over the trade effects of domestic policies, such as those under the S&P and TBT
agreements. Under these agreements, either party to a dispute can request the
formation of a technical expert group to examine the scientific merits of standards that
appear stricter than international norms. The work of the expert group is then used by
the panel; such panels may, but are not required to, seek information from outside
sources. Some have suggested that a special catego~ of cases be established
environmentally-related disputes, before which expert opinion can also be placed.
Subsidies and Competitiveness Issues
Questions will also arise post Singapore about the relationship between
for
to
environment, subsidies and competitiveness. These include whether to change current
trade rules that restrict export and domestic subsidies, even if used for environmental
protection; whether relatively lower environmental standards should be countervailable;
and whether trade discipline on the use of subsidies might be environmentally beneficial.
The Uruguay Round increased restraints on the use of export subsidies, and these
new rules apply equally to pollution abatement and other non-primary product
industries, The idea behind limiting the use of export subsidies is to both prevent an
‘unfair’ trade advantage accruing to exporters receiving such subsidies, and to achieve
neutrality with respect to trade policies (i.e., tariffs and export subsidies).
Export subsidies for environmentally friendly products are seen as
. through which environmental protection technology could be transferred
a mechanism
to developing
countries, even though cash transfers to developing countries adopting appropriate
environmental policies and not tied to purchase of particular products, would be more29
efficient. However, there is a general reluctance to allow the use of such subsidies in
light of experience in agriculture where subsidy wars have occurred. Furthermore, if
not carefilly designed, such special exceptions for export subsidies could lead to
incentives to adopt end-of-pipe clean-up technologies as opposed to products and
processes that pollute less and are inherently cleaner, Also, any use of such subsidies
should be approached with caution because they can stimulate entry into polluting
industries. Allowance for domestic environmental subsidies not ‘generally available’
would also need to be carefully designed to prevent abuse.
Thus, while environmental allowances for export and domestic subsidies will likely
be explored post Singapore, particularly with respect to increasing access for less-
developed countries to environmental protection technology, this will probably be done
cautiously so that incentives to use subsidies (as opposed to ‘polluter-pays’ policies) do
not grow,
Other GATT Articles
Post Singapore there will also likely be a discussion of environmental issues with
other GATT Articles outside of Article XX, Table 1 earlier gives a list of GATT
articles which could potentially come under scrutiny in any attempt to rewrite the
GATT/WTO in the light of environmental concerns.
Articles I and III, the non-discrimination and national treatment cornerstones of the
GATT, could bean initial focal point for such efforts, The objective would be that they
be modified so as to allow discriminatory trade actions on environmental grounds.
While Article XX is the natural route for countries seeking to use such measures, this
will likely not preclude such changes being sought in the fiture, Under Article IX,30
various ecolabelling, issues such as those implied by recent EU policy may be raised. At
issue is the extent to which such measures represent non-transparent trade
discrimination, or impose added costs on foreign producers.
Possible issues with Articles XI and XIII could be discriminatory import bans
similar to those under dispute in the tuna-dolphin case. Pressures could be exerted here
for special environmental exceptions to these two Articles, without the need to argue
cases under the general exceptions of Article XX.
Micle XVIII, which implies less stringent discipline on less-developed countries’
use of tariffs and trade restrictions either to promote infant industries or for balance-of-
payments reasons, could be a firther focal point. Arguments could be made here either
to grant firther special rights to developing countries to
which are, in some way, environmentally enhancing.
allow use of trade restrictions
Alternatively, existing special
provisions could be restricted to make them conditional on the environment impacts of
the policies used.
With Article XIX, which deals with safeguards, (circumstances under which
countries can use trade-restricting measures to deal with import surges into their
markets), an argument that has surfaced is the need for special rules to deal with surges
from countries with environmentally lax standards or
from areas of recently determined environmental
to deal with imports of products
damage, A requirement for
environmental impact statements to be added into Article XXIV, which deals with free
trade areas, is one possible direction that discussion could take.
Finally, Part IV of the GATT (Articles XXVV-XXXVIII), which both details the
special and differential treatment developing countries are to receive in the trading
system, could still be an important element in a fiture trade and environment31
negotiation, because of the basic commitment it gives to developing countries to open
trade and, hence, compensation for environmental restraint.
Environment in a New Trnde Round
As noted above, we are still some considerable way from the launch of a new trade
round in the WTO, and some have even suggested that with ongoing 2-yearly
ministerial meetings, a form of permanent negotiation might replace the GATT Rounds
of the past. As I have indicated in a recent piece with Colleen Hamilton (Whalley and
Hamilton, 1996), I would see this as unlikely for a number of reasons; deadlines to
terminate force decisions; initial agenda forming negotiations define the bargaining set;
and they also focus the reciprocal dealing to follow. Also, the 10-year implementation
period for the Uruguay Round makes the launch of a new Round quickly unlikely.
Nonetheless, even for Singapore there have been calls for a commitment to be made
to Global Free Trade by 2015 to lead the way to new multilateral negotiations to
counterbalance regional initiatives such as APEC and FTW.
Where then does trade and environment fit into all this? I suggested above that
trade and environment seemingly is in the odd position of having enormous political
momentum behind it as a lead issue for a fiture negotiation, while at technical and
negotiating level seemingly being boxed in by problems of precedent and diticulties of
counteracting the intent of established trade rules. These problems are greatly
compounded by the North-South divide which seems to face any proposed significant
change in the area,
Trade and environment will in my view remain a lead symbolic issue to the WTO
work programme, but several developments could serve to slowly downplay itssignificance in a fiture Round, One Wou[d be a fiture Round more
traditional reciprocity than rule writing (exchanges of concessions
heavily focused on
involving the new
(post Uruguay Round) tariffs in agriculture, post MFA elimination tariffs in apparel,
bound tariffs in developing countries), Another would be fragmentation of the current
four “new-new”22 key issues of environment, Iabour standards, competition policy and
investment into separate negotiating boxes, which could happen with competition
policy and investment. Yet another would be the continued non emergence of an issue
on which developing countries could be given something in return for concessions by
them on environment.
Thus, the post Singapore scenario I see is a continued high political profile for the
trade and environment issue in the GATT/WTO, but with little substantive agreement
either before or during a subsequent negotiating Round.
22In contrast to the “ne}v”issues in the UruWay Round of semices, TRIPs and TRIMs.IV. IVIDER DIMENSIONS OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
LINKAGE POST SINGAPORE
Because of the arguments I make above regarding the prospects for progress post
Singapore in the GATT/WTO on fiture trade and environment linkage, it should be no
surprise that I also argue that the way that the trade and environment issue evolves post
Singapore will reflect a range of factors beyond the technicalities of the GATT. These
include the likely quantitative importance of what is at stake, the political divisions the
issue creates and environmental provisions of regional trade arrangements (not
discussed here in any detail)2s,
Implications of Qllnntification of Trade find Environment Linkagesz’
The preliminary indications now beginning to emerge from model based
quantitative analyses of trade and environment interactions is that those that have been
the subject of most debate and discussion in the GATT and other fora thus far may be
of largely symbolic importance, with only limited consequences for global economic
performance, On the other hand, the trade consequences of major environmental
intementions not yet figuring prominently in the trade and environment debate, such as
those that would follow from a possible global carbon tax, could seemingly be more
substantial, In an extreme case, they might even reverse the growth in world trade in
manufactures that we have seen in the last four decades of GATT-based trade
liberalization. These studies typically involve calibration of models to various
23However, see the discussion in Es[y (1994) and in Uin~onenand Whalley (1996).
24This subsection draws on the discussion in Whalley (1996b).34
benchmark or base case data sets, followed by counterfactual analysis around base
cases.
One study suggesting small effects from those trade and environment policy
linkages discussed thus far is Perroni and Wigle (1994) whose model covers six goods
and sectors chosen to allow a separation between industries with more emissions and
those with less, and to also allow separation of higher technology from lower
technology industries. They calibrate their model to a 1986 global data set covering 3
major regions, (North herica, Other Developed and Low and Middle Income
countries), and a variety of pollutant activities. Emissions generated by industrial
activity interact with various natural and geographical processes, including absorption
and transmission of particulate via the atmosphere and oceans, impacting global
environmental standards, and hence environmental quality for consumers, Having
calibrated their model to a 1986 benchmark data set, Perroni and Wig,le are able to
analyze the effects of increased trade on environmental quality by alternative trade
policy scenarios, including removal of all global trade barriers in their model. They
directly capture the welfare effects of changes in environmental standards in the form of
damage finctions in explicit utility evaluations.
Their model results suggest that increased international trade generally has little
impact on environmental quality. They also conclude that the magnitude of welfare
effects of environmental policies are not significantly affected by simultaneous changes
in trade policies when new environmental policies are introduced, Furthermore, the size
. and regional distribution of the gains from trade liberalization appears to be little
affected by environmental policies. Their tentative conclusion is that the extent of trade35
and environment interactions seem smaller than might have beeen suggested by the
intensity of debate on trade and environment up to the time of their writing (1993).
Another model based piece examining more conventional trade and environment
linkages is Low (1992), which attracted substantial attention when published because of
the similar conclusion that the trade impacts of environmentally oriented trade policies
seem sma112j. Low reports a model based calculation of the effects of possible trade
barriers being adopted in the United States to countemail perceived lax standards in key
trading partners, including Mexico, and reports their impacts on trade, He uses data on
pollution abatement costs by type of expenditure and by sector for the United States,
which are, in turn, used to infer at what level trade barriers could be introduced in the
US to counteract competitive disadvantages under an assumption of zero costs being
incurred by firms in Mexico, The effects of such trade barriers on trade are then
analyzed, using a model structure which captures relevant demand and supply
elasticities,
Low identifies pollution intensive, or ‘dirty’ industries, as those with the highest
pollution abatement expenditures. These industries are evaluated as to their
contribution to Mexico’s exports, and a simulation used to assess the effects on the
exports of a special US import tax along the lines outlined above, In Low’s data, such
expenditures currently represented only a small part of total costs incurred by US
25Lo\v’s conclusion is also consistent \\’ith that reached by Tobey (1990) \vho uses an econometric
approach to test the significance of pollution effects in a Heksher-Ohlin-Vanek model. A commodity’s
‘ relative pollution intensity is defined in terms of pollution abatement costs incurred in production
compared to similar US data, }vithendokvmentdata from Learner (1984), and trade data from UN trade
statistics. Tobey’s conclusion is that stringent environmental regulations imposed on industries in the
late 1960s and early 1970s by most industrial countries have not affected trade patterns to any
measurable extent in the most heavily polluting industries. A more recent piece by Levinsohn (1994)
concludes that differing environmental regulations across stales have little effect on location decisions;
in part because, once again, the cost shares involved are smal1.36
industries, with only 18 out of 123 industries incurring more than 10/0of the value of
their output in pollution abatement costs, On this basis alone, the impact of a special
import tax, while still dependent on assumed values of elasticities, would thus be likely
to be small.
Using a simple elasticity-based approach and 1986 data, Low’s results suggest that
the imposition of such a tax would cause a reduction of less than 2°/0 in Mexico’s
exports. This compares with an approximate doubling in real terms for Mexico’s trade
with the United States between 1985
implemented, such environmentally based
effect on direct trade flows, because the
small.
and 1992, suggesting that, if actually
trade measures would have only a small
cost components involved are themselves
However, a firther set of model based analyses, analyzing the effects of major
global environmental initiatives due to Whalley and Wigle (1991) and Piggott, Whalley
and Wigle (1993) in two interrelated modelling papers, suggest that much larger trade
effects would follow from new global arrangements designed to deal with major
environmental problems, such as carbon emissions. The purpose of these two papers is
to analyze the effects such as a possible carbon tax set at levels designed to stabilize
global carbon emissions at early 1990s levels (the so-called ‘Toronto call’, afier the
setting of such an objective at a 1989 global scientific conference in Toronto)2b. In
both models, there is a production and demand structure in each region, with CES
production finctions defined over primary factors and other inputs. Primary factors, in
turn, are broken down into energy and non-energy inputs, which cover greenhouse and
‘bAlso see the recent rene}vedcall for stringent emission targets by the International Panel on Climale
Change (IPRC); “Tough Targets on Greenhouse Gases Urged”, FinaJ7cial Ti/~les,Friday 19th July
1996,37
non-greenhouse, and carbon and non-carbon products,
composite energy and, in turn, the eventual production
This leads to production of
of energy intensive and non-
energy intensive products. International trade then takes place in energy-intensive and
other goods, and carbon based products,
In the first piece, the possible international impacts of carbon tax options are
evaluated, In the second the extent of sub-regional or unilateral country reduction in
carbon emissions which would be undertaken to deal with global warming are analyzed,
using a model extension with an explicit parameterization of preferences towards
climate change. Results from these models suggest large effects on international trade
flows from major environmental policy interventions, such as a carbon tax, The
published papers do not directly report trade impacts since this was not their major
focus, but in the presence of large carbon taxes which apply to a significant input
component for manufacturing (and where the tax rates required range as high as 800°/0
in order to generate reductions in carbon emissions to stabilize globally at 1990 levels)
the cost component feeding through to manufactures is large. The result is a potentially
major impact on international trade in manufactures, and resulting changes in global
trade patterns. Global consumption of energy intensive manufactures falls sharply, and
with it global trade. Some model scenarios suggest that taxes at such high levels as
these could have more major consequences for trade in the global economy as
developments under GATT the post-war years.
Thus, for example, in Whalley and Wigle (1991) there are major changes in net
. trade patterns between energy intensive goods and other goods for major regions.
Japan, for instance, changes from net exporter of energy intensive manufacturers to a
net importer, Other Europe, including eastern Europe, changes from a net importer to38
a net exporter, and the EU also changes from a net exporter to a net importer. In some
results in Piggott, Whalley and Wigle (1993, p. 127) there are firther reductions in trade
in the order of 50°/0from large global carbon taxes.
The implication is that major environmental policy initiatives in the post Singapore
trading system may have more significant impacts on trade pattern, than initiatives
undertaken within the GATT/WTO framework to more directly address the trade and
environment issue. The GATT/WTO has little to say about such initiatives, and yet
their implications for trade could overwhelm the trade impacts of anything done directly
in the WTO on the trade and environment issue. While a carbon agreement may still be
some years (or even decades) away, its significance for the trade and environment
debate seems clear.
Developing Countries, Property Rights and Trnde and Environ mel]t
A further important factor to take into account in charting the fiture of the trade
and environment debate post Singapore involves the developing countries, who see
linkage of trade to environmental quality as being driven largely by environmental
interests in the higher rather than the lower income countries.27 Their implicit argument
is that
higher
linking
threats
environmental quality is a luxury good, and see consumer preferences of the
income countries, not the lower income countries, as behind proposed rules
trade and environment. From their perspective, these rules largely involve
of trade restrictions being placed on their exports to pressure them to change
. their environmental policies, while richer industrialized countries seem not to be
27See the more extensive discussion of the developing counlry position on [hese issues in Whalley
(1994).39
targeted. The outcome they fear is that their growth and development is truncated by
policies targeted at environmental conservation objectives set for their economies from
outside. Developing countries, therefore, talk of ‘green’ or ‘eco’ imperialism, arguing
that if the trading system continues to develop in this way, in the long run it can only be
disadvantageous to them.
The tension is between the objectives of environmental advocates in industrial
countries, and the strongly stated interest of developing countries in being able to
pursue trade-led developmental strategies free from trade restrictions, including those
motivated by environmental concerns. The developing countries also emphasize the
extensive unilateral liberalization that has taken place in the developing world in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the trade gains which have flowed from this, and the industrial
countries who have strongly supported it. Trade restrictions against developing
countries in the name of environmental concerns of the wealthy in the developed world
seem, to developing countries, to mn counter to what they have been encouraged to do
in recent years within the trading system.
Developing countries thus argue their property rights as far as any fiture trade and
environment linkage is concerned, On issues such as deforestation,28 they argue that
the developed countries industrialized two hundred years ago and largely deforested
during the process. They question the grounds on which the developed countries now
assert rights over management of forests in developing countries, when their own
deforestation was so clearly unrestrained in earlier years. Some developing countries
go even firther and argue that they should be compensated for showing environmental
‘s See Barbier et al. (1991) \\’hoanalyze [he en~’ironmental implications of trade in forestry
products,40
restraint, rather than being penalized if they fail to adopt environmental policies
advocated by industrial countries.
These issues were strongly in evidence at the ‘Earth Summit’ in 1993 at Rio de
Janiero. The Summit was held as part of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNDED), and the North-South tensions over the
property rights issues discussed above were clearly evident. Three agreements resulted
from the Rio meeting; the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; Agenda
21; and the Forest Principles. Two further agreements were separately negotiated but
signed at RO; the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity.
The Rio Declaration states (in Principle 12) that trade policy measures used for
environmental purposes should not involve arbitrary discrimination or be disguised
trade restrictions, and that unilateral actions should be avoided. Chapter 2 of Agenda
21 stresses that all countries should benefit from an open trading system. While in no
way representing binding and enforceable commitments, these statements nonetheless
add political support to developing country positions on trade and environment issues,
and threaten to fiel whatever post Singapore divisions emerge on the issue.
Post-Singapore, trade and environment is also one of several elements of trade
policy linkage to non trade objectives which threatens to revive North-South tensions in
the trading system (trade and Iabour standards is another). These were pronounced in
the 1970s and early 1980s, but began to ebb in the mid 1980s when many developing
countries abandoned import substitution protection, liberalised unilaterally, and then
participated much more actively than before in the Uruguay Round. Having been
assured that the trading system would be structured to speed their growth and41
development, finding in the mid 1990s that trade barriers against them may go up
because of environmental concerns can only serve to uni~ developing countries in a
rediscovered common cause. Mer moving away from the perceived blocwide interest
of special and differential treatment towards pursuit of count~ interest, trade and
environment post Singapore could well be the key to reviving the pursuit of a common
Southern interest.
The trade and environment issue is thus seen by several developing countries in
negative, and even hostile, terms, To them environmental pressure groups in wealthy
countries in the developed world want to set global standards for environmental quality
which meet their preferences, not those of the developing world. The ability of
developing countries to provide environmental quality at these levels, and in ways
which do not jeopardize their ability to achieve growth and development, is the issue.
Their rallying cry is one of compensation for environmental restraint, rather than
legimitization of trade-based retaliation against environmental practices through trade
rules. If developed countries are concerned about forest cover, they have the option of
replanting trees in their own countries which they deforested centuries earlier even
though to the more vocal environmental groups in developed countries such trees
represent the lungs of the earth, a communally owned resource to be managed on a
global basis. Developing countries thus see a policy agenda emerging in the developed
world in which trade and environment plays a major role which seeks to define the
parameters of a global resource management regime, independently of their growth and
. development aspirations,42
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper seeks to map out how the trade and environment issue may play out
after the Singapore WTO ministerial meeting in December 1996, where the WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) is scheduled to offer its first report.
The paper first discusses trade and environment narrowly as a GATT/WTO issue
arguing both that relatively little is expected to be concluded in Singapore, and that
change post Singapore looks equally difficult to achieve. All ways forward to change;
waivers, general GATT/WTO exceptions, rewriting GATT Articles, seem to encounter
problems,
The paper then argues that wider developments outside GATT/WTO are likely to
prove equally if not more important to the fiture evolution of the trade and
environment issue. These include the trade impacts of new major environmental
arrangements, such as global carbon taxes; and the hardening position on these issues in
the developing world, When taken together with other factors, such as the
environmental provisions of regional trade agreements, the post Singapore prospects
for trade and environment seem likely to be shaped as much by developments outside
the GATT/WTO as within it.43
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